Abstract: This paper studies how defense procurement regulation shapes market structure and procurement spending. Restrictive negotiation rules allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to cap a winning supplier’s markup using competing offers. This lowers payments for a given set of suppliers, but it also lowers firms’ expected profits and may discourage entry. I develop a two-stage structural model, where firms decide whether to supply each product market first and then bargain bilaterally with the DoD, subject to a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) constraint that captures these procurement rules. Using novel data on 23,526 contracts for major defense systems across 85 product categories (FY1989–2019), I estimate the model and simulate counterfactual procurement rules. Without the TIOLI constraint, procurement spending rises by 117%. Additional entry recovers only 8-12% of the DoD’s lost surplus, leaving its surplus 70% lower than baseline. Replacing negotiation with an English auction lowers the DoD's surplus by less than 1% and leaves entry nearly unchanged. My results suggest that current negotiation rules for the DoD perform better than unconstrained bilateral negotiation and at least as well as an auction.
Abstract: We develop and estimate a model of auctions with endogenous prizes and economies of scale. We use it to study the competitive and welfare effects of using low-bid auctions to allocate exclusive rights to sell branded generic drugs and compare them with welfare under other pricing mechanisms, e.g., Bertrand and reference pricing. Unlike standard auctions with fixed prizes, the prizes are endogenous here because the demand depends on the winning bid and the prices of competing drugs. We estimate our model using data on outcomes of auctions for more than 100 drugs and their monthly sales to public hospitals.
Abstract: Post-Cold War budget cuts encouraged consolidation among prime contractors, an event famously known as the “Last Supper”. This wave of mergers drastically reduced the number of prime defense suppliers, giving rise to the current “Big 5” contractors. How this changed DoD contracting behavior, or whether this improved procurement efficiency, remains unresolved. This paper asks how mergers and acquisitions (M&As) shaped pricing methods for newly awarded contracts. Using newly collected contract data from DCADS and FPDS covering three decades, along with M&A events from SDC Platinum, I study the effects of mergers on contract pricing and post-award efficiency using two-way fixed effects. I find that merging entities are more likely to be awarded new contracts under cost-reimbursement than under fixed-price.
Abstract: This paper studies the export decisions of Taiwanese machinery and electronics firms. Previous exporting experience can increase machinery firms’ probability of exporting by 8.73 percentage points. Similar scenes happen in the electronics industry, previous electronics exporters increase 10.65 percentage points of possibility to export in the next period than non-exporters. I also extend the standard model to study firms’ export decisions to specific regions. The estimation results suggest that both firms’ export decisions and regional exporter decisions depend on previous exporting status, but firms’ regional export decisions have larger impacts than firms’ export decisions. Moreover, the probability of exporting varies by region with the assumption of different entry costs across regions.