(Funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Graduate Fellowship on the Fiscal and Economic Effects of Innovation and Productivity Policies, awarded through the NBER.)
Abstract: This paper studies how defense procurement regulation shapes market structure and procurement spending. Restrictive negotiation rules allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to cap a winning supplier’s markup using competing offers. This lowers payments for a given set of suppliers, but it also lowers firms’ expected profits and may discourage entry. I develop a two-stage structural model, where firms decide whether to supply each product market first and then bargain bilaterally with the DoD, subject to a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) constraint that captures these procurement rules. Using novel data on 23,526 contracts for major defense systems across 85 product categories (FY1989–2019), I estimate the model and simulate counterfactual procurement rules. Without the TIOLI constraint, procurement spending rises by 117%. Additional entry recovers only 8-12% of the DoD’s lost surplus, leaving its surplus 70% lower than baseline. Replacing negotiation with an English auction lowers the DoD's surplus by less than 1% and leaves entry nearly unchanged. My results suggest that current negotiation rules for the DoD perform better than unconstrained bilateral negotiation and at least as well as an auction.